impact of the Fukushima catastrophe on environmental concerns
On March 11,
2011, a worst-case scenario in the history of the civil use of nuclear energy
occurred: a natural disaster triggered the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.
At about 3 pm JST, the Tohoku earthquake, magnitude 9.0, struck off the east
coast of Japan at an underwater depth of about 30 km (19mi). It was the
strongest earthquake to hit Japan since record-keeping began, triggering a
gigantic tsunami with waves up to 40 m (133 ft). The tsunami’s dimensions by
far exceeded the safety measures of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant,
whose 5.7 m (19 ft) sea walls were easily topped by up to 15 m (49 ft) high
waves hitting the plant. Although the safety measures met regulatory
requirements, in total, three of the six reactors fully melted down, leading to
a major release of radioactive material into the environment. In the subsequent
days, the dimensions of the catastrophe became apparent. Within 2 days, nearly
200,000 people were evacuated, an estimated 4.5 million were without
electricity, and 1.5 million without water. In September 2011, the Japanese
Policy Agency concluded that the entire disaster, inclusive of the earthquake, tsunami,
and meltdown, resulted in 16,000 deaths, thousands of injured or missing people,
and 400,000 collapsed or partially collapsed buildings (INPO 2011). However, no short-term physical health
damages from radiation were observed as of 2013 (WHO 2013).
Identification of nuclear phaseout
effect
Compared to the
identification of the disaster effect, the identification of the nuclear phaseout
effect is more challenging for a number of reasons: First, we observe a series of
policy events rather than a single event. The initial event, the Atom
moratorium, which temporarily shut down the eight oldest reactors, was
announced and implemented on March 14, 2011, only 3 days after the Fukushima disaster.
Empirically, it is basically impossible to disentangle the effect of the Atom moratorium
from the disaster. One could hypothesize that its impact may have operated in
both directions—either reinforced or reduced environmental concerns. When
estimating the models with March 14 as the relevant policy action date, the coefficients
barely change, which could suggest that the Atom moratorium had little impact
on Germans’ concerns. Hence, we consider
the unexpected and widely covered announcement of the Nuclear Phase-Out Bill on
May 30, 2011 as the crucial policy action date.
Second, a
decrease in media coverage and thus disaster-related consciousness in the population
may have reduced environmental concerns. it sharply decreased, but remained relatively
stable at a level clearly higher than before Fukushima. The latter point is
crucial and shows that, in our opinion, it is extremely unlikely that the
entire decrease in environmental concerns can be traced back to a decrease in
media coverage and thus disaster-related consciousness in the population. Moreover,
recall that due to the incompetent management of the catastrophe by Tokyo Electric
Power Company (TEPCO)—the operating firm of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
plant—Fukushima and nuclear safety remained in the media spotlight for a very
long time.
Concerns about
climate change The sharp and unexpected U-turn in the energy policy entailed a
long-term, large-scale plan under which Germany would gradually replace nuclear
with renewable energy. Angela Merkel created the term “Energy Transition” (Energiewende)
for this ambitious plan. Since the Energiewende is inherently linked to climate
change politics and was largely communicated to the public with this spin,
column (4) tests whether concerns about climate change shifted. Indeed, concerns
about climate change significantly increased after the Fukushima disaster but significantly
decreased after the policy action, which entailed the announcement of the Energiewende.
the disaster
increased political support for the Green party in Germany, Switzerland, and
the UK. It has always been one of the Green party’s main objectives to phase
out of nuclear energy. While the increase in voter sympathies was universal in
Germany, in Switzerland and the UK, is was concentrated among people who live
in close distance to nuclear reactors. For Germany, we also find that the intensity
of political party support increased significantly, while there is no evidence that
the disaster triggered more political interest at the extensive margin.
Germans are actually willing to pay
for
nuclear-free
energy production, most likely in return for a lower level of environmental concerns.
In representative polls, 70 % claim that they would be willing to pay higher energy
prices in return for the transition to renewables. Part of the Energiewende is
a fixed subsidy for every kilowatt hour (kWh) produced by renewables. The €18bn
annual cost of this policy is paid by consumers through a tax on electricty.25 In
2013, this tax amounted to 5.3 Eurocent per kWh. Since the average household
consumes about 3500 kWh per year, it effectively pays €185 or €15 per month for
the transition to renewables. While this represents a federal mandatory tax, a
study by Check24 (2012) finds that, before
Fukushima, 37 % of all consumers who switched their energy provider chose
electricity from renewables. Immediately after Fukushima, this share doubled to
74 % and was still 64 % 1 year after the disaster.
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